In this paper, we extend previous results relating the Dolev-Yao model and the computational model. We add the possibility to exchange keys and consider cryptographic primitives such as signature. This work can be applied to check protocols in the computational model by using automatic verification tools in the formal model. To obtain this result, we introduce a precise definition for security criteria which leads to a nice reduction theorem. The reduction theorem is of interest on its own as it seems to be a powerful tool for proving equivalences between security criteria. Also, the proof of this theorem uses original ideas that seem to be applicable in other situations.
Introduction
Historically, verification of cryptographic protocols has been separated in two distinct branches. The first one, formal verification of security protocols, originates from the work of Dolev and Yao and was first described in [11] . The main hypothesis, called perfect cryptography assumption, is an abstraction of reality: the intruder can gain information on an encoded message only if he knows the inverse of the key used to create the message. Even with this strong assumption, flaws have been found in protocols that were believed to be secure (the most famous one has been exposed by G. Lowe in [17] , some of them are listed in [8] ). Under this assumption, automatic verification of security protocols is possible [22, 7] or [23, 14, 4] (even if it needs other abstractions when considering an unbounded number of sessions) and has been successfully implemented in tools such as those proposed by project EVA [24] . However, the perfect cryptography assumption needs valid foundations and this is why recent works tried to weaken this hypothesis, either by adding equational theories [9] , [1] or by other modifications of the Dolev-Yao model, adding guessing attacks for example [18] . In the second approach, encryption schemes are studied using a computational model based on Turing machines. In this context, there is no idealization made concerning the cryptographic schemes: cryptographic functions operate on strings, attackers are Turing machines and correctness is defined in terms of high complexity and weak probability of success [12, 3] . This computational approach is recognized as more realistic than the formal approach. However, its complexity makes it very difficult to develop (semi-)automatic verification methods.
In the last years, attempts have been made to bridge the gap between these two approaches. The ultimate objective is to be able to prove security in the formal model, then to prove properties on the encryption scheme and with that to deduce security of the protocol in the computational model. These first works successfully proved this kind of composition properties. Very restrictive hypothesis have been made to deal with the complexity of the computational model (as for example in the case of [20] ). The first paper in this recent trend [2] proved that a notion of indistinguishability in the formal model is valid in the computational model when making some assumptions on the encryption scheme. This means that if two messages are not distinguishable in the formal model, then their computational equivalent cannot be separated by a Turing machine in a reasonable (polynomial) time. This work has been pushed further in [25] and then in [20] . This last paper proves that if the encryption scheme verifies a certain property (called IND-CCA), then security in the formal model implies security in the computational model. The important part of this work is that it works in the case of active adversaries and so can eventually be applied to protocols working on an insecure network like Internet. Our objective in this paper is to continue this work and release some of the strong hypothesis made over protocols. Other related works include Backes, Pflizmann and Waidner [19] . In this paper, the formal model is not exactly the Dolev-Yao model, although very close. It is not clear whether protocols can be checked automatically in this formalism. Also, the cryptographic primitives are modeled at a rather detailed level in the computational model. P. Laud [16] proves safety of the formal model for symmetric encryption. In particular, he deals with encryption cycles.
Our objective in this paper is to continue this work and weaken some of the restrictions imposed on protocols in previous works. The main restriction in [20] is that secret keys cannot be part of sent messages and that message forwarding is not allowed. To weaken these restrictions, we first give a general definition of a security criterion (like IND-CCA). These criteria can be seen as a game that an intruder should not be able to win. Our first result is a reduction theorem that proves the equivalence between a criterion and simpler criteria. This allows us to prove that the IND-CCA criterion is equivalent to quite richer and useful criteria. Definition of criteria is an important part as they make it possible to release some of the restrictions over protocols made by previous works. Finally, we use these criteria in order to prove that Dolev-Yao constitutes a safe abstraction of the computational model even for protocols involving both asymmetric encoding and digital signature. The next section gives the necessary definitions for using both the computational model and the formal model. The main point in this section is the definition of polynomial random Turing machine that can access oracles. A general definition for security criteria is given in the third section. We also formulate the reduction theorem and give its proof in this section. The following section applies this theorem to prove classical and new results. In section 5, the former reductions are used to prove that when the IND-CCA assumption holds, properties proved in [20] can be extended to a wider class of protocols. Thus, this section prove that verification in the Dolev-Yao model is sound in the computational model. Finally, section 6 conclude this paper.
. The execution time of the three algorithms is assumed polynomially bounded by . A signature scheme
is also defined by three algorithms. The key generation algorithm randomly generates pairs of keys
, where to functions from string of bits (arguments) to string of bits (results). These functions are also described by polynomial Turing machines (which can also access oracles). To distinguish oracles from real functions (which can be their implementations), function names are always underlined when considering access to an oracle. The semantics of d c Q are the standard semantics of except that whenever fires a transition labeled by a function call`, the content of the results tape becomes 
Definitions for the Formal Model
In this section, we give the basic definitions that will be used to introduce the formal aspects of protocol checking. Formal studies rely on the concept of messages which are first order terms. To define messages, we first introduce three infinite disjoint sets :
and signature can be represented by encoding with a private key to sign and decoding with the related public key to verify the signature.
A Generic Reduction Theorem
In [20] , protocols allowing sending of secret keys are not considered because it is not possible in IND-CCA to encode secret keys. To solve that, we introduce a new criterion N-PAT-IND-CCA and prove it equivalent to IND-CCA. A similar result is needed to introduce signature.
A security criterion § i s defined by an experiment that involves an adversary and two ways© and¨i of implementing a set of oracles. The adversary is aware of both implementations and is allowed to call the oracles but does not know which implementation is really used. The challenge consists in guessing which implementation is used. More precisely, an adversary is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine (PRTM) that has access to a set of oracles (either¨© or¨i ). The adversary's advantage is the probability that the adversary outputs 1 when the set of oracles is¨i minus the probability that the adversary outputs 1 when the set of oracles is¨© . An encryption scheme is said § -secure, if the advantage of any adversary is negligible. In this section, we present a generic result allowing us to prove that a security criterion § . When more precision is required, this set can also be denoted by i s . In this section, we give a formal definition of a criterion and show how a criterion can be partitioned in a safe way. The theorem presented here allows us to verify that a criterion is equivalent to another one by using such partitions. This result is applied in the following sections to show an equivalence between a few security criteria.
Security Criterion
A criterion § is a collection formed by:
, this bit is the challenge that has to be guessed by the adversary. The purpose of this section is to explain the main ideas underlying the proof of the reduction theorem, the detailed proof appears in appendix B . An application of this proof to a simple example is given below. The adversary against the criterion § 3 11
simulates . To do so, he has to answer the queries made to oracles from §1
. Since cannot construct faithfully these oracles (as it does not have access to parameters from §1 with the 
Applications of the reduction theorem

Reducing N-IND-CCA to IND-CCA
The first application of our theorem will concern an already proved result: reducing N-IND-CCA to IND-CCA. A proof of this result can be found in [5] . Let
¢ ¡
be an asymmetric encryption scheme. We define the security criterion N-IND-CCA, for ¦ , where is the number of pairs of public/private keys that form the challenge, i.e. an attacker will try to break one of these private keys. Thus, an attacker is a PRTM that has access to oracles corresponding to the Above, for simplicity's sake, the adversary does not have access to the public keys whereas he should in the classical IND-CCA definition. However, it is easy to modify the previous definitions by adding oracles in h that will just output the public keys.
This result can be extended to an unbounded number of keys that is still polynomial in [21] .
Adding Patterns: N-PAT-IND-CCA
We now introduce a new security criterion and prove it equivalent to IND-CCA by using our reduction theorem. N-PAT-IND-CCA allows the adversary to obtain the encryption of messages containing challenge secret keys, even if it does not know the value of these secret keys. For that purpose, the adversary is allowed to give pattern terms to the left-right oracles. 
There is yet a restriction: we exclude encryption cycles. Hence keys are ordered and a pattern This result tells us that if an encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure, then it is still secure when adding the possibility to ask for encryption of patterns instead of just encryption of messages.
Signature
In order to extend previous results to the case of protocols using signature, we present here a new definition of security for signature scheme, UNF-CCA, which is an adaptation of Selective (Un)Forgery Against Adaptive Chosen Message Attack [13] .
The main requirement is that an adversary should not be able to forge a pair containing a message The advantage of adversary in winning the UNF-CCA challenge is defined as:
Experiment
is said to be N-UNF-CCA iff for any adversary ,
is negligible. Instead of -UNF-CCA, we write UNF-CCA. As the challenge is not anymore guessing the value of a bit , our reduction theorem cannot apply directly. However, by modifying the proof scheme given above, it is possible to deduce the following property relating the UNF-CCA and N-UNF-CCA criteria. The proof is given inappendix B . 
N-PAT-UNF-IND-CCA
To be able to deal with protocols using both an encryption scheme and a signature scheme, we define a new criterion N-PAT-UNF-CCA: a combination of N-PAT-IND-CCA and N-UNF-CCA. Let us consider an asymmetric encryption scheme
and a signature scheme
. We use two types of adversary: those who try to find the secret bit u sed in the N left-right pattern encryption oracles and those who try to produce a message and its signature under one of the N challenge signature keys. The left-right pattern encryption oracles accept patterns of the form Figure 2 given in the appendix. Then, the corresponding advantages are:
is said to be N-PAT-UNF-IND-CCA iff for all adversary ,
are negligible. The following property states that the combination of a secure signature scheme and a secure encryption scheme is still secure. Its proof can be done using the same proof scheme as for the reduction theorem. 8 8
Proposition 4.4 If
¢ ¡ is N-PAT-IND-CCA and if
To sum up, we proved the following equivalences between criteria:
Dolev-Yao is a Safe Abstraction
In this section, we give a precise formalization of the link between the two commonly used approaches for verification of cryptographic protocols, i.e. the computational approach and the formal approach. For that purpose, we first define cryptographic protocols, then we relate traces from both models. This relation is used to prove the main theorem.
Description of Cryptographic Protocols
A multi-party protocol is defined by a list of triples 
Hypothesis over Protocols
The following restrictions are made over the protocol considered in this section.
has to be executable, that is each role can be run by a PRTM. In the formal world, for any execution, secret keys of honest agents remain secrets, there is no encryption cycle, there is a nonce in each signed message that also remains secret. Moreover, we ask that messages include enough typing information to allow parsing of received messages. We also assume that any agent knows identities of all the other agents.
Computational and Formal Models
For both models, agents involved in a protocol send their messages through a network. This network is modeled by the Adversary. The Adversary intercepts any message sent by an agent. He can forge new messages using his knowledge and send these messages to agents usurping an agent's identity.
In the formal model, the Adversary is a classical Dolev-Yao Intruder [11] . In the computational model, both the Adversary and the implementation of the protocol are PRTM, denoted by can create new valid identities and thus impersonate some dishonest agents.
Non Dolev-Yao Traces
The main result of this section is that if the encryption scheme used in the implementation of is IND-CCA, then the computational Adversary acts as a formal adversary with overwhelming probability. A trace is a list of tuples ). We assume that only messages accepted by an agent appear in the trace. We now transform a computational trace into a pseudo formal trace. The resulting trace is only pseudo formal because even if messages are expressed using Dolev-Yao terms, this does not imply that there exists a formal Adversary producing this trace. The transformation given here can be seen as verification of the trace by all the honest agents working together. Their goal is to check if the adversary performed an action that is not in the Dolev-Yao model. To achieve this, messages in the computational trace (which are bit-strings) are replaced with Dolev-Yao terms using the following: Note that this is not complete as we have not yet taken into account nonces generated by the Adversary. As the Adversary is a PRTM, whenever he has to send a new nonce, he does not have to generate it randomly: he can send composed messages instead of nonces or perform operations over bit-strings (XOR, changing bit order, adding or removing bits...). Hence for the honest agents it is impossible to guess how the Adversary has chosen his nonces. This is why when transforming a bit-string corresponding to a message where an honest agent receives a new nonce, we only test if the corresponding bit-string is an already known nonce. In this case, the bit-string is associated to the nonce term. Else, it is associated to a fresh variable ¢ 
A Computational Trace is Certainly a Dolev-Yao Trace
In this section, we prove that if the encryption and signature schemes verify IND-CCA resp. UNF-CCA and if the number of possible nonces is exponential in , then the probability that a computational trace is NDY is negligible. This means that the computational Adversary, even with all the computing power of PRTM, cannot have a behavior not represented by a formal adversary. We first state this with only encryption then extend it to the case of encryption and signature. By applying this method, it is possible to gain the challenge against IND-CCA for any non Dolev-Yao trace. Thus, the probability of producing a non Dolev-Yao trace is negligible.
This theorem can be extended to protocols using both an encryption scheme and a signature scheme. 
This theorem states that if the formal property correctly under-approximates the computational property then the formal abstraction is correct. This theorem has been applied to mutual authentification in [20] and holds for nonce secrecy [10] .
Conclusion
The main result of this paper is a significant step towards reconciling the computational and the formal approaches to security. It is a contribution to a research endeavor popularized, maybe even initiated, by Abadi and Rogaway [2] and pursued by, e.g., Micciancio and Warinschi [25, 20] , Herzog [15] and others. It is the problem of relating the formal approach which assumes perfect cryptographic primitives on one hand and the more detailed computational approach on the other hand. This question comes in two different forms: 1.) passive intruder is considered and 2.) active intruder that interacts with participants running a protocol. The work of Abadi and Rogaway falls in the first category. Micciancio and Warinschi [20] work belongs to the second category. They proved that under some restrictions on the protocol, if the encryption scheme is IND-CCA then the formal model is a safe abstraction of the computational. The restrictions they put are, however, too restrictive. In this paper, we considered active intruders. Our main result is that an adversary behavior follows the formal model with overwhelming probability, if the encryption scheme is IND-CCA and the signature scheme is UNF-CCA. This result has immediate applications as automatic verification of security protocols is quite developed now and as there are encryption algorithms that verify the required properties. Our result extends previous ones and allow: A second main contribution of our paper is a formal definition for security criteria and a reduction theorem. This theorem and its proof scheme seem to apply in a wide variety of cases. It allows to prove equivalences between a security criterion and some of its sub-criteria. This theorem allowed us to give a quick proof of already known results, to generalize this to new results and we believe that it could be useful whenever one wants to relate two security criteria. Concerning extensions of this work, in [21] , we extend these results to protocols using simultaneously all the classical cryptographic primitives: asymmetric and symmetric encoding, signature and hashing. This paper also deals with simple equational theories.
When considering the famous Clark and Jacobs survey [8] , previous results can only apply to the NeedhamSchroeder-Lowe protocol, this can now be applied to a wider class of protocols as shown in appendix A. In fact, our generalisation (including results from this paper and [21] ) allows us to deduce security in the computational model for all the protocols in this survey that are secure in the formal model.
A Appendix: Security Results
The following table summarizes the protocols on which we can use our result to prove secrecy in the computational model. Secrecy in the Dolev-Yao model has been checked using HERMES (see [7] ), a protocol verifier capable of dealing with an infinite number of sessions. In the HERMES results column, OK means that the protocol has been successfully verified for the secrecy property and so the protocol is secure in Dolev-Yao model (as the abstraction made by HERMES to deal with an infinite number of sessions is safe). For more details on HERMES verification of these protocols, see [6] .
Then, for protocols that are secure in the formal model, the Computational results tells whether the protocol fits in our framework or not and so OK means that the protocol is safe in the computational model. The letters in parenthesis indicate which extension of the previous results (in particular, [20] where any exchanged messages has to be an encryption of nonces and identities using the public key of the next agent) is useful: There is a known attack of the untyped version of the protocol. Discovering this type attack automatically requires to deal with non-atomic keys. This is not yet implemented in HERMES.
B Proof of the Reduction Theorem
This section provides details of the proof of the reduction theorem. Let be an adversary to the criterion § , or deviates from its normal behavior, which means that obtains information over the challenge bit i n the left-right oracles faked in . In this case, the adversary 0 tries to distinguish between the normal behavior of , given a criterion §
, and the behavior of with the oracles given as in . The adversary 0 picks a random bit w hich will be the challenge bit given to . It also produces the missing (fake) parameters and will use the corresponding fake oracles. 
